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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



A NATIONAL LEVEL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION

by

Sean P. LeRoy

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A NATIONAL LEVEL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION


by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

In order to protect America's National Security in a post-drawdown world, the President needs to institute a high-level agency whose sole purpose is to decide where to expend our resources in order to combat terrorism around the world and preserve our national interests. The United States has come full circle from the time of President Clinton, who had a selective-engagement policy, through George Bush, who implemented a preemptive strike, and back to the current selective-engagement policy of President Obama. However, the selection process is like a game of "whack-a-mole." This thesis explains how the US came to the place we are, what we are facing now in the current Global environment, and what needs to be done to allow us to maintain a Phase 0 end-state globally.

The current United States engagement process is flawed due to a lack of a higher level unified strategy. Currently, limited resources are thinly spread across geographical regions with no cohesive end-state tied to the national interests as defined in the current National Security Strategy. This thesis develops a comprehensive framework that synergizes "whole of government" efforts on weak, failing or failed states that fall within the intersection of the strategic environment, United States desired end-state, and benefit for the engaged state. This framework represents the hierarchal relationship between national interests and the effects of increased "whole of government" efforts.

Implementation of a Joint Interagency Engagement Group enables a whole-of-government approach to engagement strategy that promotes National Interest, preserves National Security, and unifies the engagement process towards the national interest.

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INTRODUCTION

The United States is faced with a daunting challenge as it attempts to extricate itself from protracted and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This withdrawal has caused a paradigm shift from a “preemptive strike, go-it-alone strategy” to a reliance on international partnerships. The post-conflict drawdown raises the strategic necessity of defeating Al Qaida. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) must create an engagement framework that integrates all instruments of national power to focus increasingly limited resources to meet the most significant national security interests. That requirement, as one observer has declared, is, “the recognition that military resources are finite, that not all threats are equal, and that failure to reconcile those two realities risks leading the nation by a short road to bankruptcy.”¹ This thesis will explain how we have come full circle as a Nation, proving the need for a strategic framework that will allow leaders to prioritize candidate engagement states based on their potential to directly affect and enhance the United States’ national interests. Starting in the Clinton era, where selective engagement was the strategy, through the Bush years, where preemptive strike became policy, to Obama’s vision where moral hegemony is, at heart, selective engagement. However, there is no framework for implementation of that strategy. The formation of a high-level organization with appropriate level interagency expertise and authorities to corral competing agendas and synergize thoughts into a true “whole of government” engagement strategy will provide such framework.

¹Richard Hart Sinnreich, “New Military Strategy is really just a Wish List,” *Army Magazine* 61, no.4(April2011):18,<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=59755270&site=ehost-live&scope=site> (accessed November 12, 2011).

Chapter one discusses how the September 11, 2001 Al Qaida-led terror attacks on the United States changed the military policy of the United States from one of moderate levels of engagement to one that advocated a policy of preemptive strike in the defense of the homeland.² From the end of the 1991 Gulf War to the 2000 presidential elections, the United States military sought to transform and modernize to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment. The 2001 terror attacks caused a rapid paradigm shift to meet the evolving perceived asymmetric conflict. The centerpiece of this shift is depicted in President Bush's counterterrorism policy, creating a disproportionate level of effort focused on preemptive attack versus preventing and disrupting terror networks.

Chapter two focuses on President Obama's efforts to shift from a preemptive strike posture to a more moderate strategy that relies on engagement, allies, and global partners. The chapter begins with an overview of the security and economic environment facing the United States after the 2008 Presidential elections and then explores how the global economic downturn and the degraded Al Qaida threat relates to national and foreign policy. Obama's strategy centers around using all national instruments of power, with the military focusing on the defense of the homeland. Diplomatic and economic relations will be the centerpiece of the United States engagement strategy. The chapter concludes by asking a simple question: How will the United States balance the necessity of defeating Al Qaida during a post-conflict military drawdown and with a failing economy while maintaining national interests?

² Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security*, Vol 28, No. 1 (Summer, 2003), 5.

Chapter three explores the daunting challenge faced by the Department of Defense as it attempts to balance the risks associated with current budgetary declines and reduced force structure against the National Security Strategy (NSS) requirement to develop capabilities required to defend the homeland over the next decade. The chapter starts out by drawing a stark contrast between the historic interwar periods and the current political and economic environment. Analysis of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlights a Defense Department that is out of step with the concept of “moral hegemony” and the corresponding strategy presented in the NSS. The chapter concludes with a recommended strategy to focus and shape the force to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow’s globalized world to best defend and secure national interests.

Chapter four builds on the NSS concept that the United States must “be aggressive and innovative in seeking opportunities to apply both hard and soft instruments of national power in a balanced, harmonized, and agile fashion.”³ The chapter outlines a four-step engagement framework designed to aid in selection of engagement states and the synchronization of those efforts to best support national interests. Analysis of the proposed engagement framework reveals the lack of a national level engagement strategy and corresponding high-level organization with the appropriate expertise and authorities to corral competing agency and department agendas to produce a true synergistic “whole of government”⁴ engagement strategy.

³ Summary of Personal Remarks from Symposium Three: Employing Smart Power, “Dealing with Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security,” (CAIC International, Alexandria Va, September, 2009), 2.

⁴ As referenced in the 2011 National Security Strategy.

Chapter five analyzes Africa based on the regions ability to represent a common point of interest brought on by the revolutions that have occurred in both Egypt and Libya and the intense media attention given by the media. The chapter demonstrates the viability of the engagement framework by walking the reader through detailed analysis of each step to produce a focused list of engagement candidates that falls within the synergistic intersection of the strategic environment, the engaged states benefit and the strategic ends of the United States (Figure 1). The final product of the framework links the proposed African engagement candidates with a focused “whole of government” strategy that encompasses appropriate United States Diplomatic,




Figure 1 – Step 1 – ENDS (Candidate Criteria)

Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) efforts. The chapter concludes with a comparison and analysis of the proposed engagement strategy with actual African/United States engagement.

Chapter six concludes the thesis with a list of nested recommendations that require the creation of a national engagement strategy; the formation of a high level government agency with the authorities and responsibilities to implement and execute the national engagement strategy; the development of a framework to guide the selection of

engagement candidates; and a recommendation to shape the United States military to best meet the challenges of the 21 century. The chapter concludes with the realization that the requirement for the formation of an engagement framework was valid, but responsibility belongs in another agency, not in the Department of Defense.

CHAPTER 1: THE BUSH DOCTRINE ON COUNTERTERRORISM

Operational Environment – 1991-2001

The instability in the Middle East, along with the sudden fall of the Soviet Union, and the corresponding end of the Cold War, spawned two questions: “What structure of world power would follow the bipolar U.S.-Soviet competition? And what U.S. foreign policy would replace containment?”¹ The “policy of primacy – essentially hegemony – to consolidate, exploit, and expand the U.S. relative advantage”² became the dominant policy theory during the 1990s. President Bill Clinton used the United States military as a dominant instrument of national power by using it in short engagements where the technical prowess of the United States military was able to limit the number of boots on the ground and keep casualties to a minimum. This strategy was defined under the rubric of selective engagement and was essential to the underpinning of U.S. global activism.³ The policy and strategic changes during the 1990s set the United States military on a transformational path to modernize and re-scope the military to meet the massive changes of the perceived conflict environment. The changing environment led to policies which required the United States to protect its interests in several different regions simultaneously. The inaugural Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 1997 was the

¹ Barry R. Rosen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, Vol. 28 No. 1 (Summer, 2003), 5.

² *Ibid.*, 5.

³ *Ibid.*, 6.

initial attempt to set the Department of Defense on the path to be equipped to dominate two major conventional wars at the same time.⁴

September 11, 2001

We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.⁵

President George W. Bush

President Bush reversed the 1990s long standing policy of selective engagement shifting back to the United States original concept of primacy. The strategy imposed by “President Bush is, in caricature, unilateral, nationalistic, and oriented largely around the U.S. advantage in physical power, especially military power.”⁶ To support this policy, the military shifted from a posture of being able to fight two simultaneous conflicts to an extremely aggressive posture known as the “4-2-1 principle – that is, deter in four places, counter attack in two, and if necessary, go to the enemy’s capital in one of the two.”⁷

The Bush National Security Strategy and the Doctrine of Pre-emption

“Before the 9/11 attacks, a Bush presidency had been expected to place new emphasis on the concept of national interest, turning renewed attention to Great-Power

⁴ Roy Godson, Richard Shultz, “A QDR for all Seasons?” *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (2010, 2010): 54, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55324868&site=ehost-live&scope=site>. (accessed October 5, 2011).

⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: White House, 2006), 2.

⁶ Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, Vol. 28 No. 1 (Summer, 2003), 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

politics and perhaps the rise of China.”⁸ The 9/11 attacks woke the nation to the realization of its vulnerability to attack. The Bush administration’s release of the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) drastically changed the course of U.S. foreign policy. The NSS asserted the need for the United States to do everything in its power to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) via rogue states and to disrupt the operations of terrorist groups seeking to acquire them. If necessary, this would include preemptive military action.⁹ “The proclamation was widely depicted as a revolutionary policy shift, overturning the base platform of international order and potentially inaugurating”¹⁰ a new era of unilateral American militarism. It was widely perceived as the cornerstone of the Bush administration’s policy: A policy that justified the 2003 invasion of Iraq based off of the perceived terrorist links between the Hussein regime and the potential for WMD proliferation.

The Bush administration portrayed the preemptive strategy as “not the overthrow of accepted order in favor of militant American unilateralism. Rather, it saw itself as issuing a clarion call for the cooperation of all the Great Powers, guided by common values, fighting common threats, in defense of common interests.”¹¹ It was believed by the administration that the common interests to combat the proliferation of WMD by unstable entities were to “be decided at America’s discretion, under the label of leadership.”¹²

⁸ Adam Quinn, “The Deal: The Balance of Power, Military Strength, and Liberal Internationalism in the Bush National Security Strategy,” *International Studies Perspectives* 9, no. 1 (2008): 40.

⁹ Quinn, 41

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 44.

¹² Ibid.

The Bush National Strategy to Combat Terrorism

The February 2003 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism signed by President George W. Bush outlines the United States' strategy to combat terrorism after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. The document argues that motivation may differ between terror groups, but share a common framework as depicted in figure 2.



THE STRUCTURE OF TERROR

Figure 2¹³

“At the base, underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Some of these conditions are real and some manufactured. Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support.”¹⁴ States with these underlying conditions are target areas for terror organizations and offer both physical haven and underlying support in the form of training grounds and financial support that are required to plan, train, and execute both regional and global terror attacks.

The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that the “intent of our national strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its

¹³ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2003), 6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

interests, and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them. To accomplish these tasks we will simultaneously act on four fronts... by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.”¹⁵ The logic of this approach is that “leadership at the top of the pyramid provides the overall direction and strategy that links all these factors and thereby breathes life into a terror campaign. The leadership becomes the catalyst for terrorist action.”¹⁶ The loss of top leadership and subsequent replacement leadership combined with reducing resource streams cripples the organization that will lead to its ultimate collapse.

This document justifies the strategy by claiming that advances in modern technology have enabled terrorists to plan, communicate, coordinate, and execute global actions via dispersed cells. The added threat of terror organizations gaining access to WMD has magnified the threat many times over. “The new global environment, with its resultant terrorist interconnectivity and WMD, is changing the nature of terrorism. Our strategy’s effectiveness ultimately depends upon how well we address these key facets of the terrorist threat.”¹⁷

The failure of this strategy is that it does not adequately address the underlying conditions at the base of the pyramid. The strategy blindly relies on the assumption that failed or failing states have the ability to eliminate terrorist havens when identified by the international community. In addition, the strategy fails to link the underlying conditions to the state’s ability or inability to eliminate the haven. The document makes the bold

¹⁵ Bush, 11.

¹⁶ Ibid., 6.

¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

statement: “when states prove reluctant or unwilling to meet their international obligations to deny support and sanctuary to terrorists, the United States, in cooperation with friends and allies, or if necessary, acting independently, will take appropriate steps to convince them to change their policies.”¹⁸ The document dedicates only two paragraphs to discussing the United States strategy to aid weak states in combating terrorism. These two paragraphs are best summarized with the following quote: “we will work together to develop programs to train foreign governments in tactics, techniques, and procedures to combat terrorism. We will review funding for international counterterrorism training and assistance programs and ensure adequate resources are available to strengthen the capabilities of key states.”¹⁹

The Bush Doctrine - Analysis

From 2001 to the Presidential elections of 2008, the Bush administration followed a policy of aggressively attacking terror leadership and their respective support infrastructure. During this period there were no successful terror attacks on the United States homeland. The United States remained in a constant state of war with combat troops fighting insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The insurgencies that President Obama inherited in 2008 have a direct correlation to the Bush administration’s failure to focus adequate attention at the base of the strategies pyramid (figure 2) and address the underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious and ethnic strife. The strategy, as implemented, gave clear guidance to the military’s counterterrorism role. The military’s job was to focus their collective efforts on “direct action to disrupt and

¹⁸ Bush, 17.

¹⁹ Ibid., 20.

dismantle global terror networks.”²⁰ The weak state engagement strategy focused on “programs to train foreign governments in tactics, techniques, and procedures to combat terrorism,”²¹ failed to focus on the underlying conditions at the base of the terror pyramid structure. Because of this inherent failure in Bush’s policy, the United States clearly missed the opportunity to use the full spectrum of military capabilities to engage weak states in an attempt to strengthen their political framework to eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism.

²⁰ Busch, 20.

²¹ Ibid., 18.

CHAPTER 2: THE OBAMA DOCTRINE ON COUNTERTERRORISM

The Operational Environment - 2008

The American moment is not over, but it must be seized anew. To see American power in terminal decline is to ignore America's great promise and historic purpose in the world.¹

President Barack Obama

President Obama came into office "with the vision of America re-inventing itself as a more open and tolerant nation and practice what has been termed a "moral hegemony.""² It is a vision that pursued multilateralism versus unilateralism, steering the nation away from aggressive geopolitics and eliminating the need to exercise hard coercive unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world.³ This vision is hampered by the nation's daunting challenge of extricating itself from the protracted and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while continuing to strengthen its national security by engaging and disrupting Al Qaida operations around the world.

In 2008, President Obama inherited a United States that was in a state of financial crisis that was deeply rooted in the nation's failing private financial institutions, which by early 2009 acted to undermine both the global and U.S. economies.⁴ In an attempt to prevent a recession, and restore U.S. and global confidence in the financial institutions, he pushed a sweeping \$700 billion bailout package through Congress. This act pushed the national deficit over the \$10 trillion mark. A debt held predominantly by the

¹ Allan Watson. "US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order," *Antipode* 42, no. 2 (2010): 242.

² Ibid., 245.

³ Ibid., 243.

⁴ Ibid., 245.

governments of “Japan and China along with a number of oil exporting countries.”⁵ This economic reliance on foreign governments potentially tipped U.S. hegemony towards a downward glide path, substantially weakening the nation’s ability to effectively wield and balance all four national instruments of power on the world stage. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) signed by President Obama outlines how the United States will rebound from its present malaise and pursue a “national strategy of renewal and global leadership – a strategy that rebuilds the foundation of American strength and influence,”⁶ recognizing that strength abroad must start at home with a strong economy and reduced deficit.

President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) explains the guiding principles that underpin President Obama’s strategy of moral hegemony. The end of the cold war, combined with the rapid rise of globalization, has intrinsically linked governments and the global economy together. “These advances have been accompanied by persistent problems. Wars over ideology have given way to wars over religious, ethnic, and tribal identity; nuclear dangers have proliferated; inequality and economic instability have intensified; damage to our environment, food insecurity, and dangers to public health are increasingly shared; and the same tools that empower individuals to build enable them to destroy,”⁷

⁵ Watson, 245.

⁶ Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy, May 2010*, (Executive Office of the White House, Washington D.C.: 2010), 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

President Obama believes that the international architecture of the post-World War II system is buckling under the weight of new globalized threats. The “global economy has accelerated the competition facing our people and businesses, and the universal aspiration for freedom and dignity contends with the new obstacles.”⁸ The United States will continue to demonstrate world leadership by meeting these challenges by strengthening alliances, maintaining a strong military, strengthening the U.S. economy, and revitalizing the nation’s strong and evolving democracy.⁹ “The United States of America will continue to underwrite global security - through commitments to allies, partners, and institutions; by focusing on defeating Al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the globe; and through our determination to deter aggression and prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”¹⁰ The NSS states that the United States, regardless of how powerful, cannot meet the global challenges alone.¹¹ Renewing America’s global leadership role is at the center of the National Security Strategy. “This strategy recognizes the fundamental connection between our national security, our national competitiveness, resilience, and moral example. And it reaffirms America’s commitment to pursue our interests through an international system in which all nations have certain rights and responsibilities.”¹²

At the center of the NSS is the belief that focusing efforts inward to rebuild the nation’s economy will strengthen America’s ability to lead in a world where economic

⁸ NSS, I.

⁹ Ibid., I.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

power and individual opportunity are more diffuse.¹³ The inward focus allows for the rebuilding of decaying infrastructure, and renews a commitment to ensuring the nation is secure and resilient against terror attacks and natural disasters.

Alliances

President Obama stresses that the key to American prosperity and security lies with the need for American leadership to renew engagement with old friends, allies and partners. “We will also pursue diplomacy and development that supports the emergence of new and successful partners, from the Americas to Africa; from the Middle East to Southeast Asia.”¹⁴ At the center of the strategy is the goal of advancing constructive cooperation on security matters in specific regions, such as “violent extremism and nuclear proliferation, to climate change, and global economic instability - issues that challenge all nations, but that no one nation alone can meet.”¹⁵ The United Nations-supported NATO operations in Libya are a current example of President Obama’s vision of using alliances to support national interests. The NSS pursues a policy of expanding outreach to emerging nations who demonstrate their ability to be models of regional success and stability.

A Whole of Government Approach

President Obama’s vision included in the NSS discusses the “Whole of Government” Approach” to national security. It is an approach that promotes coordinated effort across all departments and agencies to align resources and capabilities

¹³ NSS, 2.

¹⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵ Ibid.

to meet the challenges facing the homeland and allies. He states, “we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same.”¹⁶ The United States military will underpin these efforts by maintaining conventional superiority, nuclear deterrent, preserve access to the global commons and continue to strengthen partners.¹⁷ Major engagement strategy and efforts shift away from the military arena and will rely on increased investment in diplomacy, resulting in the development of sound political and economic institutions that complements and strengthens our alliances. The vision links the concepts of defense, diplomacy, economic, development, homeland security, intelligence, strategic communications, and the American people along with private sector into a cohesive partnership. Operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq are clear examples of a “whole of government” approach linking interagency functions to a desired end-state.

President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism

The June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism represents a clear paradigm shift from the previous administration’s aggressive counterterrorism doctrine. The new Counterterrorism (CT) strategy concentrates the United States’ military CT efforts on defeating Al Qaida in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, and Yemen. The CT strategy changes the focus of the struggle from military action to a new expanded CT definition that now focuses on the previously mentioned “whole of government”

¹⁶ NSS, 14.

¹⁷ Ibid., 14.

approach,” which embeds the new “CT strategy within an overall strategy of enhanced U.S. economic and political engagement.”¹⁸

The direct assault on Osama bin Laden’s compound that resulted in his death best represents the primary CT role envisioned by President Obama for the United States military. According to the President, “the death of Osama bin Laden marked the most important strategic milestone in the effort to defeat Al Qaida. It removed Al Qaida’s founder, leader, and most influential advocate for attacking the United States and its interests abroad.”¹⁹

The Obama Doctrine - Analysis

President Obama started his presidency with the vision of America re-inventing itself as a more open and tolerant nation. He envisioned the United States to be a moral hegemon as the world’s last remaining superpower. The United States policy shifted from unilateral to multilateralism, with the intent of steering the nation away from aggressive geopolitics and eliminating the need to exercise hard, coercive, unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world.²⁰

The cornerstone of this policy is the renewed reliance on international alliances and increased reliance on the concept of the “whole of government” approach to CT as seen in the CT operations in North Africa. This approach represents a fundamental shift from the “preemptive strike, go-it-alone” doctrine of the previous administration. Diplomacy and economic strength are the driving factors behind protection of the

¹⁸ Barack H. Obama, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2011), 16.

¹⁹ Obama, 3.

²⁰ Allan Watson. “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order,” *Antipode* 42, no. 2 (2010): 243.

homeland in the Obama Presidency. The U.S. military will underpin these efforts and defend the homeland through vigilant and persistent threat surveillance and provide the President with kinetic options if required.

Under this policy there have been no successful foreign terror attacks committed on U.S. soil. The Obama CT doctrine attempts to disrupt, dismantle, and deter terror activity against the United States and her interests by focusing the military on kinetic strikes in concert with the “whole of government” and alliances to starve terrorists of resources and strengthen partners to deter activity. This approach is intended to strengthen United States leadership abroad and build a resilient and economically sound homeland.

President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism improves on the 2003 George Bush strategy. President Obama continues with the policy of aggressively attacking the leadership and the organization at the top of the pyramidal structure of terror (figure 2). The Obama strategy makes considerable strides at strengthening the middle of the pyramid by expanding the “whole of government” approach and leveraging alliances to improve the welfare of partner states and the international environment.

Because the United States is currently facing a global economic crisis, it cannot afford to fully engage the underlying conditions of terror. The President’s CT strategy accepts risk at the base of the pyramid, as current CT operations are focused on attacking the top of the pyramid to buy time for the United States to come to terms with a \$10 trillion deficit and recover from an extended economic recession, and to re-establish itself self-image as the world leader. This top of the pyramid attack plan keeps the VEOs focused on survival, and therefore, limits their ability to plan and execute operations

against the homeland. This strategy buys time, but fails to adequately address the underlying conditions of terror that feeds the top of the pyramid.

Al Qaida and its affiliates remain a persistent threat to the United States and her allies, and have not lost a desire to attack the homeland and international interests abroad. President Obama recognizes the long term threat and states “we can’t prevent every threat from coming to fruition...we are focused on building a culture of resilience able to prevent, respond to, or recover fully from any potential act of terror directed at the United States.”²¹ We must manage this risk for long term security. How will the United States balance the necessity of defeating Al Qaida with a post-conflict military drawdown and a failing economy while maintaining our national interests?

²¹ Barack H Obama, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2011), 4.

CHAPTER 3: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSESSMENT

The Operational Environment

The end of the Cold War put the United States military on a transformational path set to modernize and re-scope the military to meet the changes in the new conflict environment. The inaugural Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), from 1997 set the Department of Defense on the path to be equipped to dominate two major conventional wars at the same time.¹ The September 11, 2001 terror attacks and the, Iraq invasion in 2003 highlighted the different type of enemy the United States would face in the future by exposing a “serious gap between the changed nature of the conflict environment and the doctrine and means it had available for fighting it.”² The 2006 QDR put the Defense Department on a course to update doctrine with the current conflict environment, an environment that was no longer conventional, but asymmetrical and irregular in nature. The Department elevated irregular warfare to a vital mission area breaking a long standing paradigm of structuring and resourcing the force to fight multiple simultaneous conventional conflicts.

Over the past decade, the Pentagon’s baseline budget has increased by 40 percent and, if the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan are factored in, it soars to a 70 percent increase.³ These staggering expenditures during an economic downturn, combined with the U.S.

¹ Roy Godson, Richard Shultz, "A QDR for all Seasons?" *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (2010, 2010): 52, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55324868&site=ehost-live&scope=site>. (accessed October 5, 2011).

² Ibid, 54.

³ Travis Sharp, "Vision Meets Reality: 2010 QDR and 2011 Defense Budget", *Center for New American Security*, 2010, 2, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/853230048?accountid=12686>. (accessed October 5, 2011).

population's weariness over the protracted wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the Defense Department to reevaluate the types of conflicts the United States will face over the next decade. This reevaluation is further hindered by the political decision to withdraw from the overseas conflicts and rapidly reduce military force structure in an attempt to harvest and redistribute scarce resources for perceived higher priority domestic consumption.

Historical Challenge

There is a significant and historic difference in the drawdown the military is experiencing now versus past post-war drawdowns. Each of the previous conflicts experienced a formal conclusion. World War II ended with the formal surrender of the Axis powers. Korean conflict hostilities were suspended after all parties signed a formal armistice. Vietnam officially concluded after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. The 1991 Iraq conflict ended after the coalition met the United Nation's mandate to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The United States has not concluded its current conflict. The National Security Strategy and National Counterterrorism Strategy both acknowledge the long term struggle and commitment to defeating violent extremism as




Figure 3, Long Term Trends in National Defense Outlays⁴

⁴ Jeffrey Tebbs, "Pruning the Defense Budget," (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 2007).

far away from U.S. soil as possible. Figure 3 provides a graphic description of the historic demobilization trends of the past 70 years. This graph represents the abyss the nation now faces. The American people are demanding an end to the current conflicts and forcing the government to focus inward to solve domestic issues. The U.S. will withdraw its military from Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the conflict the U.S. is engaged in against violent extremism will continue in an increasingly globalized world.

Clausewitz describes a trinity that surrounds a nation's ability to successfully wage war. The trinity represents the synergistic relationship between a nation's people, its government, and its military (Figure 4). When all three entities are in synergistic harmony, risk is minimized and conflict can be successfully managed and sustained.




Figure 4, Trinity (Synergy)

Figure 4, pictured above, represents the trinity after the September 2001 attacks. The people, government, and military were in balance with synergistic harmony, thus overcoming fog and friction, and managing the inherent risks of armed conflict.

The 2008 domestic economic crisis in the United States, combined with the protracted decade long conflict following the 2001 attacks, has caused the trinity to fall out of synergistic balance (Figure 5). The will of the American people is forcing the




Figure 5, Trinity (Out of Balance)

government to rapidly shift policy and withdraw forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. This reduction in overseas commitments precipitates the corresponding reduction in force structure that allows the diversion of limited tax dollars to domestic programs. This shift places unknown and increasing risk on the nation's ability to defend the homeland and protect national interests abroad.

The resulting imbalance brings forward the question: How will the United States balance the necessity of defeating Al Qaida with a post conflict military drawdown and a failing economy while maintaining our national interests? The National Security Strategy and the National Counterterrorism Strategy clearly define the end-state requirement of defeating Al Qaida and its networks/affiliates. These documents have also redefined the ways in which America is to achieve this end-state. The increased reliance on partners, alliances, and using the combined departments of the federal government in the "whole of government" approach, has, in effect, reduced the perceived reliance on the military as an instrument of national power. This strategy makes the military extremely vulnerable to large force structure reductions due to the current economic environment. The imbalance forces the military into the difficult position of

choosing between a force structure required to protect national interests against a future unknown foe, and a strategy that relies much more heavily on the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power than military power.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was the Department's effort to adjust capabilities and resources to the fiscal realities and policy shifts brought on by the 2008 Presidential elections and the faltering economy. There is one certainty that no planning can get around. The United States will go to war with the military it has, when the conflict arises and the nation calls. The 2010 QDR reverts back to the parochial paradigm of building and maintaining a force capable of defeating two conventional forces simultaneously. In addition, it is an attempt by the Department of Defense to hedge their bets against an unknown future foe during a post-war military drawdown. This QDR "contains no reference to irregular warfare as a central organizing concept, shedding the focus of the preceding 4 years. Rather, the 2010 QDR postulates an uncertain, fluid conflict environment posing a plethora of threats—all of which must be prepared for simultaneously."⁵ The review uses the term "hybrid" to describe the complexity of the future conflict environment, which is caused by the rapid growth of globalization, involving a mixture of traditional and non-traditional state actors that blurs the categories of future conflicts.⁶ The QDR states "we must take seriously the need to plan for the broadest possible range of operations—from homeland defense and defense

⁵ Roy Godson, Richard Shultz, "A QDR for all Seasons?" *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (2010, 2010): 53, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55324868&site=ehost-live&scope=site>. (accessed October 5, 2011).

⁶ Godson and Schultz, 56.

support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions—occurring in multiple and unpredictable combinations.”⁷ The future enemy or their surrogates could attack information systems, impede access to natural resources, exert economic and diplomatic leverage, and limit global access to areas of strategic national interest to the United States.

To combat these threats, this QDR positions the force to “project power, deter aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners. In addition, this QDR directs more focus and investment in a new air-sea battle concept, long range strike, space and cyberspace, among other conventional and strategic modernization programs.”⁸ To posture the force to meet these threats, the QDR focuses on the following six key missions: “Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home; succeed in today’s large scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations; build the security capacity of partner states; deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments; prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and operate effectively in cyberspace.”⁹ These missions should help the DoD in their efforts to focus their priorities. However, this is not necessarily the case as will be seen in the next section.

⁷ Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, D.C., Dept. of Defense, 2001), 8.

⁸ *Ibid.*, i.

⁹ Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Fact Sheet February 1, 2010*, (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 2010), 1.

The Department of Defense – Analysis

Quadrennial Defense Review

Doctors Roy Godson and Richard Schultz describe the 2010 QDR as a “QDR for all seasons, one that directs attention and defense dollars to less likely contingencies and the most expensive capabilities to deal with them.”¹⁰ The QDR calls for the United States military to “prevail” in today’s conflicts and “prepare” the force for future wars. “The “diverse threat scenarios” conceptualized in the QDR give short shrift to the real-world irregular conflicts and the major actors, state and non-state, that will challenge U.S. security for decades to come.”¹¹ The QDR states that the United States faces a complex and uncertain world that is driven by rapid globalization and technological advances. In addition to rising non-state actors that will exert pressure on international affairs, the rise of China as a competitor will challenge United States regional influence. Yet the only empowered non-state actor that the 2010 QDR gives attention to is “Al Qaida’s terrorist network.”¹² Other than Al Qaida, there are only passing references to insurgents and criminals. This threat is unceremoniously lumped into one of the six QDR focus areas: Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations. “The complexity, seriousness, and multiplicity of threats emanating from weak states facing insurgencies, transnational terrorists, or criminal networks are missing in the QDR.”¹³ Instead, the QDR raises the threat of facing multiple state actors utilizing anti-access tactics as the highest threat. By raising this threat to the highest level, the QDR is able to defend the

¹⁰ Roy Godson, Richard Shultz, “A QDR for all Seasons?” *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (2010, 2010): 53, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55324868&site=ehost-live&scope=site>. (accessed October 5, 2011).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹² *Ibid.*, 54.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 53.

“QDR for All Seasons” and position itself for the defense of resources during a post-war drawdown.

The QDR strategy has merit. Through its own analysis, the QDR predicts a turbulent and uncertain security environment. By defending a large force structure, the Department of Defense is hedging its bet that a large, diverse force structure will be able to overcome unknown conflict that is looming in this new globalized world and giving credence to the thought... *Luck favors the larger battalion.*

As discussed previously within this chapter, the U.S. must make an effort to insure the synergistic balance of the trinity between the American people, the government, and the military remains intact. In our democracy, the government and the military are in place to support the will of the American people. This has historically led the government to create policy to support the will of the people that are normally followed by economic constraints that drives the military apparatus as shown by the NSS and administration’s policy statements. By system design, the military is the lagging member. This QDR represents the very real mismatch between the desired end-state required by the American people and the means or resources available to achieve this goal. The Department of Defense, without a clear strategy, is attempting to resource against all perceived threats.

Failed/Failing States

The NSS and QDR imply that the greatest threat the United States will face in the future is from hostile state actors utilizing anti-access techniques that lead to major conflicts in multiple theaters. The QDR puts a great deal of emphasis on preparing the force to confront a state actor in large scale combat operations and very little emphasis on

shaping the environment to prevent the conflict. “The changing international environment will continue to put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the frequency and severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states.”¹⁴

“Over half of the world’s approximately 195 states are weak, failing, or failed.”¹⁵ These states could be ground zero for most of the future conflicts the United States will face. The competition for resources within these unstable states and regions will allow terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and militias to exploit conditions through violence¹⁶ by destabilizing the state and increasing the potential for armed conflict between state actors due to competition for access to increasingly limited global resources.

Focusing the Force

The current economic environment does not allow the Department of Defense to maintain a force large enough to deter and win in two simultaneous, large, conventional conflicts. The U.S. military’s traditional role over the past century has been to protect the homeland by engaging in conflicts far from American soil and keeping the American populous isolated from conflict. “The United States will face a complex, uncertain, and fluid 21st-century security environment. Fast-paced and accelerating change driven by globalization and technological innovations will make continuity in the sources of conflict problematic.”¹⁷ There is no evidence that the current security environment will end the prevalent and enduring pattern of irregular conflict that persists in many of the

¹⁴ Godson and Shultz, 54.

¹⁵ Ibid., 54.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

developing global resource rich regions that are critical to a safe and vibrant U.S. and global economy.

“To be sure, competent authoritarian states such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia may well constitute future conventional security challenges for the United States, and attention to their long-term maturation is essential.”¹⁸ The Department of Defense strategy must take these threats into account when defending against drastic force structure reductions caused by a post-conflict drawdown. However, priority must be given to the greatest and most probable threat facing the nation. The Department of Defense must focus the force on the asymmetric threats that have the highest probability of negatively impacting United States national interests.

The United States military has focused both informational and kinetic efforts on Al Qaida leadership and the supporting organization with increasing success. The pyramidal structure of terror (Figure 2) highlights the critical nodes that must be attacked and eliminated to defeat a terror organization. Attacking the top of the pyramid



THE STRUCTURE OF TERROR

Figure 2¹⁹

¹⁸ Godson and Shultz, 54.

¹⁹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2003), 6.

slows and deters the terror organization and secures a lot of political capital. However, the ultimate defeat mechanism is really found at the base by attacking the underlying conditions of failed states to remove exploitation opportunities used by terrorists as they establish their organizational foundation. As previously stated, “over half of the world’s approximately 195 states are weak, failing, or failed.”²⁰ The United States cannot afford to assist and aid all 195 states. Priority must be given to security of the homeland and critical national interests. All aspects of the U.S. government should target potential states that meet these requirements for engagement. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) must create an engagement framework that integrates all instruments of national power to focus limited United States resources on criteria that meet the United States national interests. The key “ingredients of any viable strategy are the recognition that military resources are finite, that not all threats are equal, and that failure to reconcile those two realities risks leading the nation by a short road to strategic bankruptcy.”²¹

Shaping the Force

The QDR focuses the Department of Defense on six key mission sets: “Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home; succeed in today’s large scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations; build the security capacity of partner states; deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments; prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and operate effectively in

²⁰ Roy Godson, Richard Shultz, “A QDR for all Seasons?” *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (2010, 2010): 54, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55324868&site=ehost-live&scope=site>. (accessed October 5, 2011).

²¹ Richard Hart Sinnreich, “New Military Strategy is really just a Wish List,” *Army Magazine* 61, no. 4 (04, 2011): 18, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=59755270&site=ehost-live&scope=site> (accessed November 7, 2011).

cyberspace.”²² These six mission sets direct the military to prepare for all contingencies at the expense of the most probable and nearest threat. The diverse QDR driven scenario the military is directed to focus on drives missed “opportunity to capitalize on real-world experiences and hard won expertise.”²³

Building security capacity of partner states is the only mission set that hints at an offensive capability to defeat the underlying conditions of terror in figure 2. “Expanding security force assistance to weak states so they can protect their populations, resources, and territory is essential”²⁴ to this task.

As the United States military comes off the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense must engage with the “whole of government” to capitalize on the unique skill sets that 10 years of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations have provided and insert influence into selected weak, failing or failed states to insure we secure national interests. The Department of Defense must link national interests to “ongoing and future operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities”²⁵ into the military’s global posture and strategy.

²² Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Fact Sheet February 1, 2010*, (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 2010), 1.

²³ Roy Godson, Richard Shultz, “A QDR for all Seasons?” *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (2010, 2010); 55, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55324868&site=ehost-live&scope=site>, (accessed October 5, 2011).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Washington, DC, 11 August 2011), II-7.

Department of Defense Way Ahead

The QDR “proposes rebalancing the Armed Forces to prepare to execute the six mission areas noted over the near-term, midterm, and long-term”²⁶ time horizons. The scenarios that drove the Department of Defense to these mission areas “represent the full spectrum of plausible future challenges that might call for a response by the United States military.”²⁷

The QDR places the highest emphasis on deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments. This mission set represents large procurement programs designed to modernize and recapitalize the force as it withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense is using an “all contingencies are equal” approach to defend as much capability and force structure as possible during this era of declining budgets.

The message must change. According to Roy Godson and Richard Schultz in their article “A QDR For All Seasons,” the most likely conflict the nation faces will come from one of the previously mentioned weak, failing or failed states. The six mission areas must be linked together under the banner of “shaping the environment.” The goal of every action, either militarily or by other government organization when dealing with state and/or non-state actors, should be to aid in shaping the strategic environment towards benefiting the interests of the United States. Maintaining a cohesive strategic environment is the foundation of the Phase 0 approach. Joint Publication 5-0 (JP-5) describes a six-phase planning process for theater campaign planning (Figure 6).

²⁶ Roy Godson, Richard Shultz, “A QDR for all Seasons?” *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (2010, 2010): 56, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55324868&site=ehost-live&scope=site>. (accessed October 5, 2011).

²⁷ Godson and Shultz, 56.




Figure 6 – JP 5-0 Phasing Model²⁸

The Phase 0 approach depicted in Figure 7 differs from the planning construct discussed in JP 5-0. The joint publication looks at the phasing process through the campaign planning lens. JP 5-0 provides campaign planners a deliberate phased approach to developing theater campaign plans. This deliberate planning process builds a




Figure 7 – Phase 0 Approach

comprehensive plan that provides a guide for required resources and actions in each phase of the operation. The goal of the process is to move through each phase as quickly

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011), III-41.

and efficiently as possible in order to return to a Phase 0 stable environment. The Phase 0 approach demonstrated in Figure 7 is predicated on pursuing efforts and actions that inhibit the state or regions from departing the Phase 0 environment. Phase 0 is the symbiotic environment that melds United States national interests with state or regional interests.

The Phase 0 Approach uses four actions -- Civil Authority, Deter, Initiative, and Stabilize -- to maintain or drive the region, or “shape” the environment to align with




Figure 8 – Shaping Actions

the national interests of the United States. These four actions align with four of the six primary mission sets listed in the QDR (Figure 8). Each of these primary mission sets support all of the shaping actions. In order to promote national interests, the U.S. can apply the mission sets as single actions or in combination to support all or some of the phasing actions in order to increase the synergistic efforts described in Figure 8.

Effective application of the listed Phase 0 actions at the base of the pyramidal structure of terror is the long term defeat mechanism of violent extremist organizations that threaten the United States over the next decade as described in the QDR. The base

represents the “underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife which create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Some of these conditions are real and some manufactured. Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support.”²⁹ Actions focused on countering these actions defeats the foundation of the pyramidal base of the structure of terror (Figure 2). By focusing military resources on Phase 0 shaping operations with the intent of creating an environment in regions and states that protect and enhance vital national interests, the Department of Defense minimizes the risk/threat of having to use the last two primary mission sets listed in the QDR: Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments and Preventing proliferation and countering weapons of mass destruction.³⁰

These final two mission sets are vital to the national security of the United States and are listed as such in the NSS. It is the authors opinion that the current economic and political environment will not permit the Department of Defense to maintain sufficient force structure to adequately protect the United States against these two threats without linking the mission sets into a coherent defense strategy. The American people are demanding an end to the nation’s current conflicts and are forcing the government to focus inward in order to solve domestic issues. The post-war drawdown the U.S. is entering will dictate a reduction in military force structure in an attempt to harvest and redistribute scarce resources for perceived higher priority domestic issues. Focusing the six mission sets described in the QDR on the most probable near-term asymmetric threat

²⁹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2003), 6.

³⁰ Ibid. 6.

versus trying to prepare for two simultaneous large-scale, conventional threats will allow for an affordable and efficient force that can be maintained during this post-war period.

President Obama stated in the NSS that the “armed forces will always be the cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries.”³¹ To meet the President’s desired strategic end-state of the United States leading the world through moral hegemony, we must “build and integrate the capabilities that advance United States national interests and the interests we share with other countries and peoples.”³²

The Department of Defense is facing a critical decision point in our nation’s history. The Department has the only trained and capable resources ready for immediate application to achieve the stated strategic end-state in the NSS. The overwhelming majority of Phase IV and V operations being performed by military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that the State Department and other government agencies are ill-equipped to handle Phase IV/V operations (Figure 6) alone. As the nation’s armed forces, hardened by over 10 years of conflict and practiced in all five phases of combat operations, begin to step off the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, they must be used to implement and augment the remaining instruments of national power to achieve the nation’s strategic end-state. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti is the latest example of the

³¹ Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy, may 2010*, (Executive Office of the White House, Washington D.C.: 2010), i.

³² Ibid.

military's Phase IV/V dominance over other government agencies abilities. Within hours of the devastating earthquake, the U.S. military was on the ground aiding civil authorities, stabilizing the area, and rendering assistance to the devastated nation and her people.

The Department of Defense must create an engagement framework that integrates all instruments of national power to focus limited United States resources on criteria that meet the United States' national interests. The foundation of this structure must capitalize on the unique capabilities and capacity the armed forces have to preserve, enhance and shape United States national interests within states and regions.

CHAPTER 4: ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

The Engagement Framework

The United States must “be aggressive and innovative in seeking opportunities to apply both hard and soft instruments of national power in a balanced, harmonized, agile fashion.”¹ The goal of this engagement framework is to develop a path which blends all elements of national power into a structured “practical national security strategy that will work effectively and best serve the United States, its allies, and the world, now and in the future.”² The heart of the framework revolves around the concept of smart power application to maintain the Phase 0 environment described in the previous chapter. The March 24, 2009 Symposium titled “Dealing With Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security” defined smart power as: “An integrated national security strategy that effectively and efficiently combines both hard and soft power appropriate for the specifics of each situation, and that adjusts as the particular threat evolves.”³

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the United States cannot afford to expend resources on all 195 weak, failing or failed states. The limited resources available for overseas engagement must be used sparingly and have direct, long-term benefit to United States’ national interests.

The Department of Defense currently manages its engagement process through the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, through

¹ United States Naval Institute. Employing Smart Power, Dealing with Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security:Executive Summary, International Inc and U.S. Naval Institute (USNI), 2009, 2.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 35.

the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), aids in the direction of the Combatant Commanders. The SECDEF produces and administers guidance in the form of the Global Employment of the Force (GEF) to the combatant commanders. The Chairman, with the understanding of the global strategic environment and an understanding of the entire Joint Force role in the strategic end-state, produces the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that focuses the SECDEF's GEF information into theater specific tasks. The Combatant Commander then produces Theater Plans that highlight capability gaps that prohibit him from successfully completing his mission in support of the strategic ends. These resource gaps are addressed in the integrated priority list for Future Year Defense Funding (FYDP).

The major flaw in the current process is the lack of a clear higher-level strategy that vets Geographical Commanders engagement strategies against their ability to utilize the “whole of government” approach directed by the NSS. The process turns into a resource distribution plan in which Geographical Commanders “peanut butter spread” inadequate resources across their geographic region versus focusing on states that are vetted against a national strategy in order to achieve national interests.

Figure 9 represents a recommended four-step process to guide senior leadership through the selection of which region/state to engage. This four-step process is an adaptation of the standard “Ends, Ways, Means model” in which decision points are incorporated into the model to aid the SECDEF or other government agency head to work clockwise (Figure 10) starting from the Strategic Ends box. It analyzes potential states and or regions for engagement consideration based on the strategic environment and linkage




Figure 9 – Engagement Framework

back to the desired strategic ends. The model makes the initial assumption that if the state is not one of the 195 weak, failing or failed states, then a Phase 0 environment




Figure 10 – Step 1

exists and the current U.S. government initiatives and engagement strategy is assumed to be successful and therefore resourced adequately.

If the initial assessment deems a state is weak, failing or failed, it is then looked at through the strategic; Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) lens to determine initial value against the United States strategic ends in relation to the

environment. If the proposed state engagement falls within the synergistic intersection of the environment, state benefit and United States strategic ends (Figure 1), the state will proceed to Step 2 for WAYS development if approved by the SECDEF or agency head.




Figure 1 – Step 1 – ENDS (Candidate Criteria)

The proposed engagement state or region next moves into Step 2 (Figure 11) where the SECDEF or equivalent agency head evaluates the proposed engagement against the United States national interests and the elements of the pyramidal structure of terror to determine how the United States government, the foreign state's government, and the insurgency or violent extremist organizations all view the environment to determine the




Figure 11 – Step 2

validity of the proposed engagement. These multiple views are an essential element of decision making because it allows senior leaders and planners to accurately comprehend the environment, understand the problem, envision ways to affect strategy, and build a list of potential ways to engage states or regions. The Department of Defense, at both the strategic and operational levels, currently develops clear and accurate thermals of the environment which is demonstrated in current Geographical Commander's Theater Campaign Plans. The problem arises from the lack of clear strategy from Step 1. Without a clear national engagement strategy, Step 2 of the framework is unable to track, build and coordinate effective "whole of government" engagement approaches (WAYS) to support national interests in the state or region being discussed. Figure 12 is a graphic




Figure 12 – Scatter Effect

representation of the scatter effect uncoordinated efforts have in relation to the strategic ends from Step 1. Step 3 must analyze the entire list of proposed engagement states with the intention of eliminating weak candidates while building linkages between others in order to synergize and maximize efforts in support of national interests and strategic end-states.

“Current United States National Security policy documents and future global trends drive the requirement to create and maintain a strategic level organization to integrate the four elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and

economic (DIME).”⁴ Currently the only organization within the United States government coming close to fulfilling this requirement is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIAC). The JIAC was formed by Joint Forces Command and currently focuses on, and is limited to counterterrorism efforts in the Pacific Command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). “Limiting the JIACG to counterterrorism fails to meet the full needs of the strategic objectives of the United States. To achieve the goals that the president has laid out in the NSS, the JIACG should take on a much greater role, particularly because meeting the United States’ strategic goals requires the coordination and execution of all the elements of national power.”⁵ Because of this, the federal government should institute a new organization to meet this challenge.

The engagement framework requires, within Step 3 (Figure 13), the development of the Joint Interagency Engagement Group (JIEG). This organization needs to have the authority to vet candidate engagement states and regions the interagency community nominates and create the final synergized list of states/regions for engagement. The JIEG




Figure 13 – Step 3

⁴ Harold Van Opdorp, “The Joint Interagency Coordination Group the Operationalization of DIME,” *Small Wars Journal*, Volume 2, (2005), 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

uses the national interests listed in the NSS as the guiding criteria for validating and selecting states and regions that the United States government chooses to expend resources on in support of engagement efforts. Figure 14 represents the hierarchal relationship between national interests and the effects of increased unified “whole of




Figure 14 – Threshold Pyramid

government efforts.” The security of the homeland is the greatest national interest and is the foundation for the remaining national goals. From this strong foundation, the United States economy can flourish. A secure and economically vibrant United States is able to stand on top of the world stage and promote international order which will ultimately lead to global support of universal values.

Not all weak, failing, or failed states will meet a value threshold that warrants the level of effort and resources required for engagement. The QDR states “the United States will face a complex, uncertain, and fluid 21st-century security environment. Fast paced and accelerating change driven by globalization and technological innovations will make

continuity in the sources of conflict problematic.”⁶ Limited resources and increasingly limited access to these resources will aggravate this strained security environment. The JIEG must lean towards a realist view when using the threshold pyramid to evaluate engagement candidates and judge the balance between attacking the underlying conditions of terror with those of the national interests of the United States. Figure 15



Figure 15 – Threshold Decision (Pyramid)

demonstrates the pyramidal approach to determining the threshold decision in a different view. At the foundation lies the security of the United States. Above that is the U.S. economy followed by international order and universal values. The JIEG will need to evaluate how the potential engagement will aid or benefit national interests against the cost of attacking the underlying conditions of terror. The model demonstrates the scale and relationship of national interests. The more the sections interlock over the United States security, the greater the value of the potential engagement. Successful examples of this interlock are the ongoing United States engagement efforts in Columbia. Colombian

⁶ Roy Godson, Richard Shultz, "A QDR for all Seasons?" *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 59 (2010, 2010): 54, <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55324868&site=ehost-live&scope=site>. (accessed October 5, 2011).

engagement, through the use of multiple U.S. government agencies, has aided the Colombian government to combat the civil unrest brought on by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). The resultant efforts that attacked all levels of the pyramidal structure of terror have delivered Columbia from chaos and lawlessness to a strong Western hemisphere regional partner.

The next step (Figure 16 – Step 4) in the process has JIEG planners develop the “whole of government” engagement approach by using appropriate DIME capabilities to bring the state or region into, or maintain, the phase 0 environment that is conducive to United States national interests. Currently, the United States government has had limited




Figure 16 – Step 4

success in this area of engagement, with the major successes coming in Iraq and Afghanistan after large scale military operations moved into phase IV, Stability Operations, which required interagency expertise the military did not have organically available.

Figure 17 graphically explains the results of the Step 4 analysis. The culled list of JIEG candidate states is aligned with appropriate “whole of government” efforts. The result




Figure 17 – MEANS

is a highly refined MEANS that efficiently meets United States ENDS. The MEANS is the synergistic sum of the “whole of government” WAYS plus the culled list of engagement states the JIEG produces.

Framework Analysis

Environment

The “diverse threat scenarios conceptualized in the QDR give short shrift to the real-world irregular conflicts and the major actors - state and non-state - that will challenge U.S. security for decades to come.”⁷ The phase 0 shaping concept at the core of the engagement framework provides a logical methodology to determine priority states and regions for United States engagement using the President’s “whole of government” vision, attacks the underlying conditions of terror, and drives a phase 0 environment to support United States national interests. At the heart of the security challenges described

⁷ Godson and Shultz, 53.

in the NSS and QDR is the increased competition for scarce natural resources and challenged access by state and non-state actors through littoral waters and ungoverned areas. This framework provides the structure for the “whole of government” to synergize and focus engagement efforts on states that have true value to the long term national interests of the United States by forcing engagement candidates to meet a tangible threshold of long-term national strategic value. The focused effort will allow limited national resources to have maximum impact during an extended period of austere fiscal economic reality.

Framework Process

Steps 1 and 2 of the process must be completed individually by the stakeholder government agencies. Each agency looking at potential engagement candidates will bring unique perspectives as to why the particular state warrants United States




Figure 15 – Threshold Decision (Pyramid)

engagement. The Central Intelligence Agency will have different motivations to engage in a state or region than an agency focused on human rights, communicable diseases, energy security, etc. Each agency will be able to provide insight on particular aspects of

national interests and aid the JIEG in vetting the candidate against threshold criteria. The agency perspectives bring all the national interests into perspective to support the threshold pyramid and select the candidate.

Joint Integration Engagement Group

Steps 3 and 4 must be owned by the Joint Integration Engagement Group.

Without the formation of a cabinet level organization with appropriate level interagency expertise and authorities to corral competing agendas and synergize thoughts into a true “whole of government” engagement strategy, engagement efforts will continue to be




Figure 18 – Risk Reduction

“peanut butter spread” across competing agendas, increasing risk to national security, and mitigating positive, but unfocused efforts to strengthen national interests. Figure 18 demonstrates the synergistic and positive effects of the JIEG owning Steps 3 and 4. Current global economic realities are forcing the United States to reallocate limited resources from traditional engagement efforts to domestic social programs. The JIEG, with appropriate authorities, will link current fiscal realities with an overall engagement

strategy to states and regions that have a high cost-to-benefit ratio in relation to national interests.

This framework builds on the NSS concept that the United States must “be aggressive and innovative in seeking opportunities to apply both hard and soft instruments of national power in a balanced, harmonized, and agile fashion.”⁸ The four-step engagement framework is designed to aid in selection of engagement states and the synchronization of those efforts to best support national interests. Analysis of the proposed engagement framework reveals the lack of a national level engagement strategy and corresponding high-level organization with the appropriate expertise and authorities to corral competing agency and department agendas to produce a true synergistic “whole of government” engagement strategy.

⁸ Summary of Personal Remarks from Symposium Three: Employing Smart Power, “Dealing with Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security,” (CAIC International, Alexandria Va, September, 2009), 2.

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS

Africa

The author chose Africa as the region to analyze using the described engagement framework (Figure 9) based solely on its ability to represent a common point of interest brought on by the “Arab Spring” revolutions that occurred in both Egypt and Libya and the intense attention given by the media. The intent of this analysis is to test the framework methodology and not to advocate for engagement in a particular region.

The following process analyzes potential states and or regions for engagement consideration based on the strategic environment and linkage back to the desired strategic ends. If the state is weak, failing or failed it is then looked at through the strategic Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) lens to determine initial value against the United States strategic ends in relation to the environment. If the proposed state engagement falls within the synergistic intersection of the environment, state benefit and United States strategic ends (Figure 1), the state will proceed to Step 2 for WAYS development after SECDEF or agency head approval.




Figure 1 – Step 1 – ENDS (Candidate Criteria)

Africa – Step 1




Figure 10 – Step 1

Strategic Ends

The strategic end-states of the United States, regardless of engagement state or region are the enduring national interests stated in the NSS. “They are:

1. The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
2. A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
3. Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
4. An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”¹

Global Environment

Globalization has irrevocably changed the global environment. The rapid rise in communications and technology “has shrunk” the globe and intertwined state and non-state actors within the global economy. No longer can events beyond the United States

¹ Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy*, may 2010, (Executive Office of the White House, Washington D.C.: 2010), 7.

borders be considered isolated events with little impact on national security and economic well being. This new environment has allowed for the rise of violent extremism and insurgency in ungoverned states and regions forcing the failure of weak governments. This influence on the previously mentioned weak, failing or failed states impedes the global economic well being and increases regional and, ultimately, global instability.

Geographic Environment

North Africa and the “Arab Spring” took center stage on the African continent throughout 2011 and will continue to garner close global attention as Egypt and Libya attempt to stabilize after the successful overthrows of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. It is yet to be determined if these two revolutions will allow for democratic-style stability in the region or help seed violent extremist safe havens to further destabilization of the region. Northeastern Africa from Sudan to the Horn of Africa sub-region is plagued by instability, famine, and lack of resources which has promoted instability and allowed for ungoverned regions. This area is prone to pirate operations, hindering access to littoral waters leading to damaged global economic interests. The southern region of the continent, particularly the eastern coast, has vast natural resources that, if accessed by legitimate state governments, could stabilize the region, bring prosperity to the states’ populous, promote human rights, and be positive contributors on the global stage.

Failing/Failed State

The African continent is made up of 54 states most of which are weak, failing, or have failed. The evaluation of the environment, in accordance with the framework, is then looked at through the strategic Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic

(DIME) lens to determine initial value against the United States strategic ends in relation to the environment. If the proposed engagement state falls within the synergistic intersection of the environment, state benefit and United States strategic ends (Figure 1), it will proceed to Step 2 for WAYS development after SECDEF or agency head approval.

Africa – Step 2




Figure 11 – Step 2

United States Government View

United States security is the foundation of the nation's economic strength, value system, and allows the United States to promote international order through President Obama's vision of moral hegemony. Security engagement activities designed to disrupt and decapitate violent extremist leadership, infrastructure, command and control and financing are critical to securing the homeland and should be accomplished by the military and other governmental agencies outside of the United States borders to minimize damage to homeland infrastructure and populous. States within the north and northeastern African regions harbor violent extremists linked to Al Qaida and intend to bring harm to the United States, her allies and partners, and should be engaged and eliminated. The southern region of Africa has an elevated potential to harbor violent

extremists due to vast ungoverned regions bordered by weak and failing states. Weak, corrupt governments within these states are exploiting and profiting from the sale of natural resources with minimal regard to aiding the population. Access to these vital natural resources will become problematic as peer competitors challenge for these limited resources.

The competition for limited resources will become more difficult as the global population and economy increases. The nations on the African continent hold vast oil and mineral reserves. "Total trade (exports plus imports) between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa more than quadrupled between 1990 and 2007, from \$17 billion to \$81 billion."² Increased private sector investment is "reluctant to invest in Africa, despite its enormous profitable opportunities, because of the relatively high degree of uncertainty in the region, which exposes firms to significant risks."³ These risks include:

Political instability: The region is politically unstable because of the high incidence of wars, frequent military interventions in politics, and religious and ethnic conflicts.

Poor infrastructure: The absence of adequate supporting infrastructure-telecommunication, transport, power supply, skilled labor-discourage foreign investment because it increases transaction costs.

High protectionism: The low integration of Africa into the global economy as well as the high degree of barriers to trade and foreign investment has also been identified as a constraint to boosting direct investment to the region.

Corruption and weak governance: Weak law enforcement stemming from corruption and the lack of a credible mechanism for the protection of property rights are possible deterrents to direct investment in the region."⁴

² Danielle Langton and Vivian C. Jones, *U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond*, (Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003), 2.

³ Chantal Dupasquie and Patrick N. Osakwe, "Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance Challenges and Responsibilities," *ATPC Work in Progress, Economic Commission for Africa*, no. 21 (2005), 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

Efforts to stabilize and improve the above conditions will promote U.S. private sector investment, and improve long term access to resources.

Appreciation for universal values is a challenge in all developing nation states. Human rights violations and a blatant disrespect for universal values runs rampant in many of the 54 nation states on the African continent. Corruption and weak governance are the primary cause of these violations. The WAYS from Step 2 should focus United States efforts on political stability, infrastructure, corruption and weak governance. These efforts will aid and strengthen governments to prevent human rights violations and improve universal values, driving the engaged states and regions towards eventual international order.

Foreign Government's View

Engaged states will have a positive, but potentially cautious, view/opinion of United States engagement efforts. Initial engagement efforts of a weak, failing, or failed state should focus on the state's internal and external security issues. The country's internal security is the foundation on which economic prosperity, universal values and international order are built. Engagement efforts must first focus towards the security and economic realms. The long-term United States goals of establishing human values and international order must be implemented at a slow and steady pace as the foundation of security and economic prosperity take hold. With this approach, the candidate government will see United States engagement as a positive and pursue this path to prosperity by welcoming U.S. private sector investment and ensure long term access to resources while improving human values and eventually promote international order.

Insurgency View

The insurgents will view United States initiatives as an intrusion into their environment and potentially react violently to engagement efforts, state authority, and the local population. Insurgent efforts will focus on diminishing or discrediting the United States efforts to strengthen political stability, infrastructure, corruption and weak governance. The initial goal of the insurgents will be to extend United States involvement, increase the cost of the engagement and have the United States lose the will to continue. Continued long term efforts, focused on the WAYS developed in Step 2, to attack the underlying conditions that feed the insurgency will create a secure, stable environment that forces the insurgents into assimilating into society or seeking refuge in other states or regions.

Africa – Step 3




Figure 13 – Step 3

The JIEG will evaluate all competing agency's proposals against the engagement threshold. The threshold is broken down into benefits (national interests) that the engagement will possibly result in. When looked through the lens of national interest, Africa warrants United States engagement efforts. Figure 19 represents the graphic




Figure 19 – Africa Threshold Decision (Pyramid)

representation of how African engagement efforts will support national interests. U.S. security interests are supported by direct military action in the north and northeastern African regions against Al Qaida and other violent extremist organizations who seek to harm the United States. These kinetic operations must coincide with ongoing shaping operations to aid in removing or minimizing the underlying conditions that support terrorism and instability within the state. Additional shaping activities need to be centered through central, western and southern African regions to bolster state and regional security. This allows for the prosperity of the populous and prevents the state from becoming a stronghold that harbors violent extremist organizations who seek to destabilize the state or bring harm to the United States. Combined DIME (“whole of government”- civil authority, initiative, stabilize) shaping operations need to be spread across the continent to match the security and economic interests of the United States. Figure 20 is a graphic representation of priority engagement efforts in Africa. U.S. security is the foundation of all engagement activities. Symbiotic African and U.S. economic opportunities further enhance the attractiveness of mutual beneficial engagement. This approach will benefit the national security and global economy while

strengthening the engaged state's ability to care for its populous and helping lead to international order and human values.

Africa – Step 4




Figure 16 – Step 4

In step 4, the JIEG develops the “whole of government” approach to unify the United State’s efforts in the highest priority states in order to maximize efficiency and “whole of government” efforts to achieve national interests. The framework reduced the scatter effect of 54 potential engagement states, each with multiple associated WAYS (Figure 12) into a manageable, efficient, synergistic and focused effort (Figure 17) centered on benefiting United States national interests. Figure 20 represents the frameworks suggested engagement states. The states selected match vital U.S. security




Figure 12 – Scatter Effect




Figure 17 - MEANS




Figure 20 – Proposed African Engagement States

issues, requiring unilateral military action in addition to the “whole of government” phase 0 shaping operations. In addition, it applies appropriate shaping activities to support and protect U.S. private sector investment in states that are critical to global economic growth and for future access issues.

Framework Analysis - Africa

The proposed engagement strategy meets the strategic end-state of both United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Bureau of African Affairs (State Department) mission statements. The summary of these mission statements focuses on defending and strengthening the national interests of the United States. The suggested steps from the engagement methodology maximize the use of the “whole of government” and suggest a small military footprint in the DIM E strategy for most states and regions. These small government footprints in the engagement regions will minimize the unintended consequence of a perception of United States dominance that could overshadow the positive engagement impacts.

The analysis supports the thesis position that phase 0 shaping activities, using a “whole of government” approach, supported by a unified strategy for a state or region, will have maximum benefit to national interests. The analysis also supports the thesis position that as the United States enters a resource-constrained post-war drawdown period, the combined “whole of government” strategy depicted in the framework provides unity of effort by maximizing limited resources over an increasingly complex and globalized world.

The framework suggests that Africa is an excellent candidate for true “whole of government” efforts. Small, efficient engagement footprints as suggested in figure 20 using varying levels of DIME engagement may deter aggression against the United States homeland. Attacking and removing the underlying conditions that foster political instability, corruption, poor infrastructure, and weak governance and, in turn, promote stability and prosperity has a two-fold effect. The stable environments within these resource rich states and regions become viable economic partners and are removed as

“safe haven” states that could harbor violent extremist organizations that could attack the homeland. Figure 18 represents how properly used DIME resources, focused at the




Figure 18 – Risk Reduction

appropriate state or region, promotes/creates the Phase 0 environment.

Current U.S. Engagement in Africa

The current engagement locations do not match the strategy that the model suggests. The United States military is leading kinetic and military engagement operations in Northern Africa against VEOs that represent a threat to the homeland. The individual embassies within each state are operating separate plans based on each Ambassador’s desire within their respective states. Figure 21 represents the locations of private sector investment and military engagement. Additional detailed analysis would be required to truly validate the strategy described by the use of the framework or to invalidate the current United States engagement strategy portrayed in Figure 21. The analysis implies that there is currently a lack of coordinated “whole of government” effort. The graphic highlights the clear demarcation between military action in the

Northern regions and private sector investment in the resource rich Western and Central African regions. The states within those regions have a historic record of human rights violations and weak governance. This weak governance, as discussed earlier in the




Figure 21 – Actual U.S. African Engagement

chapter, is the leading detractor for increased U.S. private sector investment. The framework suggests using unified DIME shaping efforts to aid the state to improve security and strengthen civil authority, aid the promotion of national interests, and improve human values and move the state in line with international order. The theory the framework uses is that as security improves, the economic situation will improve, which will lead to improved respect for human values and willingness for the state to align with international order.

RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION

President Obama started his Presidency with the vision of America re-inventing itself as a more open and tolerant nation, and envisioning the United States to be a moral hegemony as the world's last remaining superpower. The United States policy shifted from unilateralism to multilateralism with the intent of steering the nation away from aggressive geopolitics and eliminating the need to exercise hard, coercive, unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world.¹

The corner stone of this policy is the renewed reliance on international alliances and increased reliance on the concept of the “whole of government” approach to counterterrorism (CT) as seen in the CT operations in North Africa. This approach represents a fundamental shift from the preemptive strike, “go-it-alone” doctrine of the previous administration. Diplomacy and economic strength are the driving factors behind protection of the homeland in the Obama Presidency.

This strategy relies on the development of four interlocking concepts centered on efforts designed to maintain the symbiotic relationship of the Phase 0 environment. The first concept is the development of a comprehensive strategy that synergizes “whole of government” efforts on weak, failing or failed states that fall within the intersection of the strategic environment, United States desired strategic end-state, and benefit for the engaged state. This strategy represents the hierarchal relationship between national interests and the effects of increased “whole of government” efforts. The security of the homeland is the nation's greatest national interest and is the foundation of the remaining

¹ Allan Watson, “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order,” *Antipode* 42, no. 2 (2010), 243.

national goals. From this strong foundation, the United States economy can flourish. A secure and economically vibrant United States is able to stand on top of the world stage as an example of moral hegemony and promote international order which will ultimately lead to global support of universal values.

The development of a Joint Integration Engagement Group (JIEG) is required to manage and execute the strategy. Without the formation of a high level organization with appropriate level interagency expertise and authorities to corral competing agendas and synergize thoughts into a true “whole of government” engagement strategy, engagement efforts will continue to be “peanut butter” spread across competing agendas, increasing risk to national security, and mitigating positive but unfocused efforts, to strengthen national interests. The JIEG, with appropriate authorities, will link current fiscal realities with an overall engagement strategy to states and regions that have high cost to benefit ratio in relation to national interests.

The JIEG must develop an engagement framework that blends all elements of national power into a structured and “practical strategy that will work effectively and best serve the United States, its allies, and the world, now and in the future.”² The heart of the framework revolves around the concept of smart power application to maintain the Phase 0 environment. The United States cannot afford to expend resources on all 195 weak, failing or failed states. This framework will allow the limited resources available for overseas engagement to be used sparingly and ensure direct long-term benefit to United States national interests.

² Summary of Personal Remarks from Symposium Three: Employing Smart Power, “Dealing with Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security,” (CAIC International, Alexandria Va, September, 2009), 2.

The Department of Defense must shape the force to meet the “complex, uncertain, and fluid 21st-century security environment.”³ As the nation’s armed forces, hardened by over 10 years of conflict and practiced in all five phases of combat operations, begin to step off the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, they must be used to implement and augment the remaining instruments of national power to achieve the nation’s strategic end-state. The Department of Defense must insert its expertise into an engagement framework that integrates all instruments of national power to focus limited resources on criteria that meet the United States national interests. The foundation of this structure must capitalize on maintaining a Phase 0 environment by utilizing the unique capabilities and capacity the armed forces have to preserve, enhance and shape United States national interests and security within states and regions.

The thesis was predicated on the statement: The United States Department of Defense (DoD) must create an engagement framework that integrates all instruments of National Power to focus limited United States resources on criteria that meet the United States national interests. Research and analysis validated the need for an engagement framework; however, development, application and analysis of the framework has revealed that ownership, management and execution authority must be maintained by an independent agency capable of incorporating the “whole of government” effort. The future global environment is uncertain and will continue to evolve. The JIEG, with appropriate responsibilities and authorities, will enable the United States to shape the global environment to benefit its national interests by focusing engagement efforts on weak, failing and failed states.

³ Summary of Personal Remarks from Symposium Three, 2.

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VITA

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